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Abstract
The ad hoc coordination problem is to design
an autonomous agent which is able to achieve
optimal flexibility and efficiency in a multi-
agent system with no mechanisms for prior
coordination. We conceptualise this problem
formally using a game-theoretic model, called
the stochastic Bayesian game, in which the
behaviour of a player is determined by its pri-
vate information, or type. Based on this model,
we derive a solution, called Harsanyi-Bellman
Ad Hoc Coordination (HBA), which utilises
the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in
a planning procedure to find optimal actions
in the sense of Bellman optimal control. We
evaluate HBA in a multiagent logistics do-
main called level-based foraging, showing that
it achieves higher flexibility and efficiency than
several alternative algorithms. We also report
on a human-machine experiment at a public
science exhibition in which the human partici-
pants played repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma and
Rock-Paper-Scissors against HBA and alter-
native algorithms, showing that HBA achieves
equal efficiency and a significantly higher wel-
fare and winning rate.
1 Introduction
We are concerned with the ad hoc coordination problem,
in which the goal is to design an autonomous agent,
called the ad hoc agent, which is able to achieve optimal
flexibility and efficiency in a multiagent system that
admits no prior coordination between the ad hoc agent
and the other agents. Flexibility describes the ad hoc
agent’s ability to solve its task with a variety of other
agents in the system. Efficiency is the relation between
the ad hoc agent’s payoffs and time needed to solve the
task. No prior coordination means that the ad hoc agent
does not know ahead of time who the other agents are
and how they behave. In particular, there are no prior
agreements on information sharing, communication and
action protocols, standards, etc.
This problem is motivated by the fact that there is a
growing number of agents, both robotic and virtual,
which are employed in an increasing number of areas.
Given that a primary goal in agents research is to in-
crease the autonomy and thus lifetime of agents, it can
be expected that agents based on different technolo-
gies may have to interact in nontrivial ways, without
knowing a priori who the other agents are. This moti-
vates both the notion of flexibility, since the other agents
could be based on any kind of technology, and efficiency,
since there may be no time for long learning periods,
especially if interactions are sparse. Human-machine
interaction problems (e.g. robots used in rescue scenar-
ios or software agents used in trading markets) can be
viewed as a special case of ad hoc coordination, since
humans have extremely variable behaviour (flexibility)
and expect agents to be able to interact quickly (effi-
ciency), while there may be no prior description of the
human’s behaviour (no prior coordination).
There have been several attempts to address ad hoc
coordination in multiagent systems, e.g. [Bowling and
McCracken, 2005,Dias et al., 2006,Stone et al., 2010a].
While all of these works are relevant to ad hoc coordina-
tion, the assumptions made by the solutions therein im-
ply that they only address certain aspects of the larger
problem. For example, in [Bowling and McCracken,
2005, Dias et al., 2006] it is assumed that all agents
follow pre-specified plans which include roles and syn-
chronised action sequences for each role, and in [Stone
and Kraus, 2010, Stone et al., 2010b, Barrett et al.,
2011,Agmon and Stone, 2012] it is assumed that the
other agents’ behaviours are fixed and known, and that
all agents have common payoffs. We also note that the
problem descriptions in these works are of a procedu-
ral nature, associated with the specific tasks considered
therein. Therefore, there is a need for a formal model
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of the ad hoc coordination problem, general enough to
accommodate a wide spectrum of problems.
A related problem is known in game theory as the in-
complete information game. Therein, each player has
some private information relevant to its decision mak-
ing of which the other players are not aware, which is
what relates the incomplete information game to the ad
hoc coordination problem. [Harsanyi, 1967] introduced
Bayesian games in which the private information of a
player is abstractly represented by its type, admitting a
solution in the form of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Since then, there have been several works on learning
in Bayesian games, e.g. [Jordan, 1991,Kalai and Lehrer,
1993,Dekel et al., 2004]. While the notion of private in-
formation is useful to describe the ad hoc coordination
problem, the learning processes and solutions studied
therein are not directly applicable, since the focus has
traditionally been on equilibrium considerations but
not on efficiency. On the other hand, much work in mul-
tiagent systems has focused on efficiency, whilst often
making central assumptions about the other agent’s
behaviours [Albrecht and Ramamoorthy, 2012]. There-
fore, it is natural to ask if these fields can be combined
to address ad hoc coordination in a useful way.
Inspired by this question, we model the problem using a
game-theoretic construct called the stochastic Bayesian
game, in which a player’s behaviour is determined by
its type. Based on this model, we give formal defini-
tions of flexibility and efficiency, and we define ad hoc
coordination as the problem of optimising flexibility
and efficiency, subject to the constraint that the ad hoc
agent is unaware of the players’ type spaces, and hence
the rules by which their types are assigned. Our model
allows for both the definition of Bayesian Nash equi-
librium and, since it satisfies the Markov property, the
definition of Bellman optimal control [Bellman, 1957],
a key result in intelligent agents. We combine these two
concepts to obtain a solution which we call Harsanyi-
Bellman Ad Hoc Coordination (HBA). HBA does not
rely on a central assumption about the other agents’
behaviours. Instead, it allows for the specification of
multiple such assumptions which are provided to HBA
as a set of user-defined types, each corresponding to
a different hypothesis of how an agent might behave.
Based on the agents’ observed actions, HBA computes
probability distributions over the user-defined types,
called posteriors, and utilises them in a planning pro-
cedure to find optimal actions.
HBA has a number of useful features with respect to ad
hoc coordination. The fact that the user-defined types
may encapsulate any kind of behaviour means that HBA
can potentially deal with a variety of different agents,
including agents which maintain beliefs about the be-
haviour of the HBA agent, or any other type of recursive
reasoning. We show this in a human-machine experi-
ment conducted at a public science exhibition, in which
HBA was able to manipulate the beliefs of humans in
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma such that both ended up
cooperating, thus maximising its efficiency. HBA also
supports the possibility that agents may switch between
different behaviours. We address this by introducing
temporally reweighted posteriors which allow HBA to
quickly recognise changed types. In our human-machine
experiment, this allowed HBA to achieve a significantly
higher winning rate in Rock-Paper-Scissors than the
human participants and an alternative algorithm.
A central feature of HBA is that it can use the types
to plan in the entire state space of the problem (in-
cluding unseen states) provided that the posteriors and
user-defined types are reasonably accurate. To accom-
modate the case in which none of the user-defined types
accurately describe an agent’s behaviour, HBA is able
to include methods for opponent modelling. We propose
an opponent modelling method, called conceptual type,
which can be viewed as a kind of type that specifies
the conceptualisation underlying a behaviour, rather
than specifying the behaviour directly. The conceptu-
alisation is combined with the observed actions of an
agent to generalise its actions to unseen states and im-
prove accuracy in rarely visited states. We demonstrate
these features in a multiagent logistics domain called
level-based foraging, in which HBA is able to achieve
significantly higher flexibility and efficiency than three
alternative algorithms (JAL [Claus and Boutilier, 1998],
CJAL [Banerjee and Sen, 2007], WoLF-PHC [Bowling
and Veloso, 2002]), using just a few user-defined types.
2 Defining Ad Hoc Coordination
2.1 Stochastic Bayesian Games
As discussed earlier, ad hoc coordination can be defined
based on the notion of private information in Bayesian
games. However, in their original form [Harsanyi, 1967],
Bayesian games are not descriptive enough to allow us
to model the kinds of problems we are interested in, as
they do neither include states nor time. Therefore, we
combine Bayesian games with the concept of stochastic
games [Shapley, 1953] to obtain a more descriptive
model which we call stochastic Bayesian game:1
Definition 1. A stochastic Bayesian game (SBG) con-
sists of:
• discrete state space S with initial state s0 ∈ S and
terminal states S¯ ⊂ S
1A related model are I-POMDP, in which agents face
incomplete information with respect to the state of the world
and the behaviour of other agents [Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi,
2005]. However, I-POMDP are extremely complex and their
solution methods are infeasible in most problems.
• players N = {1, ..., n} and for each i ∈ N :
– set of actions Ai (where A = A1 × ...×An)
– type space Θi (where Θ = Θ1 × ...×Θn)
– payoff function ui : S ×A×Θi → R
– strategy pii : H×Ai ×Θi → [0, 1]
• state transition function T : S ×A× S → [0, 1]
• type distribution ∆ : N0 ×Θ→ [0, 1]
H contains all histories Ht = 〈s0, a0, s1, a1, ..., st〉 with
t ≥ 0, (sτ , aτ ) ∈ S ×A for 0 ≤ τ < t, and st ∈ S.
We also define several classes of type distributions:
Definition 2. A type distribution ∆ is called static if
∀t, tˆ ∀θ ∈ Θ : ∆(t, θ) = ∆(tˆ, θ), else it is called dynamic.
Definition 3. A type distribution ∆ is called pure if
∀t ∃θ ∈ Θ : ∆(t, θ) = 1, else it is called mixed.
A SBG starts at time t = 0 in state s0. In state st, the
types θt1, ..., θ
t
n are sampled from Θ with probability
∆(t, (θt1, ..., θ
t
n)), and each player i ∈ N is only informed
about its own type θti . Based on the history H
t, each
player i chooses an action ati ∈ Ai with probability
pii(H
t, ati, θ
t
i). Given the joint action a
t = (at1, ..., a
t
n),
the game transitions into a successor state st+1 ∈ S
with probability T (st, at, st+1) and every player i re-
ceives an individual payoff given by ui(s
t, at, θti). This
process is repeated until the game reaches a terminal
state st ∈ S¯, after which the game stops.
Our definition of types follows the original definition
of [Harsanyi, 1967], which means that a type determines
a player’s payoffs and strategies. However, since we
define strategies with respect to a history of states and
actions (rather than just the current state), a type may
in fact specify strategies which change over time (such
as players who learn or use recursive reasoning), and
we thus also refer to it as behaviour. Therefore, our
interpretation of types is that of a “programme” which
governs the behaviour of a player.
Each player may correspond to a specific role in the
game. For instance, if we model a soccer team, player 1
may correspond to the goal keeper. Therefore, in the
following sections, we implicitly assume that the ad hoc
agent, denoted α, controls the player of interest, denoted
i, by which we mean that α chooses the strategy pii.
Furthermore, i has a fixed type which is known to α,
and we denote its payoffs by ui(s
t, at, α).
2.2 Flexibility & Efficiency
Two important aspects of ad hoc coordination are flex-
ibility and efficiency. We now define each of them for-
mally within the SBG model. The definitions rely on
the notion of paths and probabilities of paths:
Definition 4. A path ρ in SBG Γ is a sequence
〈s0ρ, θ0ρ, a0ρ, s1ρ, θ1ρ, a1ρ, ..., stρρ 〉 where sτρ ∈ S, θτρ ∈ Θ,
aτρ ∈ A, and s0ρ = s0. A path ρ is terminating if stρρ ∈ S¯,
otherwise it is non-terminating. Given a type distribu-
tion ∆ for Γ, the probability of path ρ is defined as
Pr(ρ|Γ,∆) =
tρ−1∏
τ=0
∆(τ, θτρ)T (s
τ
ρ , a
τ
ρ , s
τ+1
ρ )
∏
k∈N
pik(H
τ
ρ , (a
τ
ρ)k, (θ
τ
ρ)k)
where Hτρ is the history extracted from ρ until time τ .
For Pr(ρ|Γ,∆) to be well-defined (i.e. there is a set X
with ∀ρ ∈X : Pr(ρ|Γ,∆)≥ 0 and ∑ρ∈X Pr(ρ|Γ,∆) = 1),
it is important to note the following two implications in
the definition of SBGs. Firstly, no path ρ can be prefixed
by a terminating path, i.e., there is no sτρ ∈ ρ such that
τ < tρ and s
τ
ρ ∈ S¯. This is important since otherwise
Pr(ρ|Γ,∆) might assign positive probability to a path
which is prefixed by a terminating path and, thus, could
never occur. Secondly, the only paths that can occur are
either terminating (and hence finite) or non-terminating
and infinite (i.e. t → ∞). Thus, if Φ is the set of all
terminating paths and Ψ the set of all infinite non-
terminating paths, then
∑
ρ∈Φ∪Ψ Pr(ρ|Γ,∆) = 1.
Based on the notion of paths, we define the flexibility
and efficiency of ad hoc agent α as follows:
Definition 5. Let Φ be the set of all terminating paths
in SBG Γ. Given a set of type distributions D for Γ,
the flexibility F (α|Γ,D) and efficiency E(α|Γ,D) of α
in Γ with respect to D are defined as
F (α|Γ,D) = 1|D|
∑
∆∈D
∑
ρ∈Φ
Pr(ρ|Γ,∆)
E(α|Γ,D) = 1|D|
∑
∆∈D
∑
ρ∈Φ
Pr(ρ|Γ,∆)
(∑tρ−1
τ=0 ui(s
τ
ρ , a
τ
ρ , α)
)r1
(tρ)r2
where Pr(ρ|Γ,∆) = Pr(ρ|Γ,∆)∑
ρ′∈Φ Pr(ρ′|Γ,∆) , and r1, r2 ≥ 1 spec-
ify the relative importance between payoff and time.
F (α|Γ,D) and E(α|Γ,D) can be interpreted as, respec-
tively, the average probability that α solves a task in
Γ and the average payoff per time step α received in
solved tasks, where D specifies all constellations of types
that can occur. There may be problems in which flexi-
bility is not a relevant metric because termination is
guaranteed for some reason. In such cases, the primary
metric is efficiency.
2.3 The Ad Hoc Coordination Problem
We are now in a position to formally define the ad hoc
coordination problem. The core aspect is that there is
no prior coordination between the ad hoc agent and the
Algorithm 1 Evaluation procedure
Input: SBG Γ, set of type distributions D,
ad hoc agent α, player i (to be controlled by α)
Output: flexibility F (α|Γ,D), efficiency E(α|Γ,D)
F ← 0
E ← 0
Repeat K times:
Randomly draw type distribution ∆ ∈ D
Generate path ρ in Γ with ∆ (α controls i)
If ρ terminates do
F ← F + 1
E ← E +
(∑tρ−1
τ=0 ui(s
τ
ρ , a
τ
ρ , α)
)r1 ∗ (tρ)−r2
F (α|Γ,D)← F/K
E(α|Γ,D)← E/K
other agents in the system. We express this formally
by requiring that the ad hoc agent does not know the
type spaces Θj of the other players and, therefore, the
type distribution ∆ of the game.
Definition 6. Let Γ be a SBG with type spaces Θj ,
and let D be a set of type distributions for Γ. The ad
hoc coordination problem is to optimise the flexibility
F (α|Γ,D) and efficiency E(α|Γ,D) of ad hoc agent α,
subject to the constraint that α does not know Θj (and,
therefore, the type distributions ∆).
Computing F (α|Γ,D) and E(α|Γ,D) exactly is infeasi-
ble for all but the simplest games. We propose to approx-
imate these by using the procedure given in Algorithm 1.
The procedure generates K samples Fk ∼ F (α|Γ,D)
and Ek∼E(α|Γ,D), based on which it approximates
F (α|Γ,D) = 1K
∑
k Fk and E(α|Γ,D) = 1K
∑
k Ek.
Since all Fk and Ek, respectively, come from the same
distribution, by the law of large numbers this will con-
verge to the true values of F (α|Γ,D) and E(α|Γ,D) for
K → ∞. The procedure needs some means to deter-
mine if a path is non-terminating. This could be done,
for instance, by checking if the path reached a state
space which contains no terminal states and cannot be
left anymore, or by setting a maximum path length.
3 Harsanyi-Bellman Ad Hoc
Coordination
The problem of incomplete information is solved in
Bayesian games by assuming that the type spaces Θj
and type distribution ∆ are common knowledge. This
admits a solution in the form of the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium [Harsanyi, 1968], here defined for SBGs:
Definition 7. Let Ht be the history at time t and
define Θ−i = ×j 6=i Θj . A Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(BNE) in state st is a strategy profile (pi1, ..., pin) in
which, for all i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi, pii maximises∑
θˆ−i∈Θ−i
∆(t, θˆ−i|θi)
∑
a∈A
ui(s
t, a, θi)pi(H
t, a, (θi, θˆ−i))
(1)
where
∆(t, θ−i|θi) = ∆(t, (θi, θ−i))∑
θˆ−i∈Θ−i ∆(t, (θi, θˆ−i))
pi(Ht, a, θ) =
∏
k∈N
pik(H
t, ak, θk).
In ad hoc coordination problems, the ad hoc agent
does not know the type spaces Θj and, hence, the
type distribution ∆ of the game. Therefore, it cannot
compute ∆(t, θ−i|θi). However, using the history Ht, it
can compute a posterior Pr(θ−i|Ht) =
∏
j 6=i Pr(θj |Ht)
with Pr(θj |Ht) being the probability that player j has
type θj based on history H
t
Pr(θj |Ht) = L(H
t|θj)P (θj)∑
θˆj∈Θj L(H
t|θˆj)P (θˆj)
(2)
where L(Ht|θj) =
∏t−1
τ=0 pij(H
τ , aτj , θj) is the probabil-
ity of history Ht if the type of player j is θj , and P (θj)
is the agent’s prior belief that player j has type θj .
[Kalai and Lehrer, 1993] studied single-state SBGs (with
static pure type distributions) with players who choose
actions to maximise their expected long-term payoff.
They have shown that, if player i maintains a posterior
according to (2), and if the type distribution ∆ is ab-
solutely continuous with respect to the posterior (i.e.,
∆(t, (θi, θ−i)) > 0 ⇒ Pr(θ−i|Ht) > 0), then player i’s
predictions of future play will eventually be correct, re-
gardless of player i’s own strategy (Theorem 1 in [Kalai
and Lehrer, 1993]). It follows that, if all players maintain
such posteriors (where ∆ is absolutely continuous with
each posterior), and if all players choose their strategies
according to a modified version of (1) which replaces
the immediate payoff with the expected long-term pay-
off, then play will converge to a Nash equilibrium (NE)
of the game (Theorem 2 in [Kalai and Lehrer, 1993]). A
similar result was shown by [Jordan, 1991] for myopic
players (i.e. maximising immediate payoffs).
While these are encouraging theoretical results, there
are several potential objections concerning the use of
NE: Firstly, if there are multiple NE, then the players
may converge to a sub-optimal equilibrium. Secondly, a
NE is incomplete in that it does not specify strategies
for off-equilibrium paths. Finally, [Dekel et al., 2004]
have shown that if the posteriors of the players are not
identical, then they might converge to a solution which
is not a NE. However, our main concern with NE is
that it makes strong behavioural assumptions about the
players’ behaviours (such as perfect rationality) which
may be difficult to justify in ad hoc coordination. For
instance, there is no guarantee that all players main-
tain posteriors according to (2). The same arguments
hold for solution concepts in extensive form games,
such as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential
equilibrium [Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991].
Rather than attempting to converge to NE, it is appeal-
ing to use (1) as a best-response rule, since it maximises
the expected payoff with respect to what types the ad
hoc agent believes the other players to have and their
strategies for all types. Based on Theorem 1 in [Kalai
and Lehrer, 1993], we know that the agent’s beliefs, and
hence its expected payoffs, will be correct after some
time. However, in its current form, (1) only consid-
ers immediate payoffs whereas optimal behaviour may
require an agent to take payoffs of future states into ac-
count. Therefore, we propose to combine (1) with the
Bellman optimality equation [Bellman, 1957] to obtain
a best-response rule which we call Harsanyi-Bellman
Ad Hoc Coordination. Since ad hoc coordination re-
quires that the agent does not know the type spaces
Θj , we assume instead that the ad hoc agent is provided
with user-defined type spaces Θ∗j , and we sometimes
refer to Θj as the true type spaces.
Definition 8. Let Γ be an ad hoc coordination prob-
lem where ad hoc agent α controls player i and has
access to user-defined type spaces Θ∗−i = ×j 6=i Θ∗j .
Harsanyi-Bellman Ad Hoc Coordination (HBA) is de-
fined as ati ∼ arg maxai Eaist (Ht), where Eais (Hˆ) =∑
θ∗−i ∈Θ∗−i
Pr(θ∗−i|Ht)
∑
a−i ∈A−i
Qai,−is (Hˆ)
∏
j 6=i
pij(Hˆ, aj , θ
∗
j )
is the expected long-term payoff for player i of taking
action ai in state s after history Hˆ (ai,−i , (ai, a−i)),
and Qas(Hˆ) =∑
s′∈S
T (s, a, s′)
[
ui(s, a, α) + γmax
ai
Eais′
(
〈Hˆ, a, s′〉
)]
(3)
is the expected long-term payoff for player i when joint
action a is executed in state s after history Hˆ, with
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 being the discount factor.
HBA is a modification of (1) which replaces ∆(t, θ−i|θi)
by the posterior Pr(θ−i|Ht) (2), and in which the im-
mediate payoff ui is replaced by an altered version (3)
of the Bellman optimality equation. The actual history
Ht is used to compute the posterior, and the projected
histories Hˆ are used to generate all future trajectories.
Each user-defined type θ∗j ∈ Θ∗j is a hypothesis about
the behaviour of player j. While this gives HBA great
flexibility (as Θ∗j may include a variety of behaviours),
it is important to note that the accuracy of (3), and
hence efficiency of HBA, depends on how closely the
user-defined types capture the players’ true types. In
this respect, we state two useful properties of HBA:
Proposition 1. Let Γ be a SBG with static pure type
distribution ∆. If all players i ∈ N are controlled by an
HBA agent αi with user-defined type spaces Θ
∗,i
j , and
if ∀j 6= i : Θj ⊆ Θ∗,ij , then play will converge to NE.
This follows from Theorems 1 and 2 in [Kalai and
Lehrer, 1993] together with the fact that Θj ⊆ Θ∗,ij for
all i and j (with i 6= j), which means that the type
distribution ∆ is always absolutely continuous with re-
spect to the players’ posteriors. Note that, while this
proposition does not directly relate to ad hoc coordina-
tion, its does guarantee the minimum requirements of
convergence and optimality in self-play, as formulated
in [Bowling and Veloso, 2002].
For the next proposition, we define the class of de-
terministic learners, denoted ΘD, which consists of
all types θj where, for all times t and histories H
t,
there exists a unique sequence (χaj )aj∈Aj such that
pij(〈Ht, (a, s)〉, aj , θj) + χaj = pij(Ht, aj , θj), for all
(a, s) ∈ A×S. In other words, a deterministic learner al-
ways learns the same from a given history. By definition,
this includes all fixed (i.e. non-changing) behaviours.
Proposition 2. Let Γ be a SBG with static pure type
distribution ∆, where α controls i. If ∀j 6= i : Θj ⊆
ΘD ∧Θj ⊆ Θ∗j , then α will be optimally efficient.
This follows from the fact that there is some point af-
ter which HBA knows the players’ types (Theorem 1
in [Kalai and Lehrer, 1993]) and, since all types are de-
terministic learners, the expected payoffs (3) are correct.
Since HBA chooses actions with maximum expected
payoffs, according to the Bellman principle [Bellman,
1957], it follows that it achieves optimal efficiency. Note
that HBA is itself a deterministic learner, hence HBA
achieves optimal efficiency in self-play.
Both propositions assume that (3) can be implemented
directly, which is often infeasible. In Sections 4 and 5, we
show how HBA can be implemented as a reinforcement
learning procedure and an exact planning procedure.
3.1 Temporally Reweighted Posteriors
A potential problem with the posterior defined in
(2) is that it assigns zero probability to a type θj if
pij(H
t, atj , θj) is zero for any t. This can be problematic
for the following reasons: If the game uses a dynamic or
mixed type distribution, and if Pr(θj |Ht) = 0 for a type
θj that is not currently the true type of player j, then
Pr(θj |Hτ ) = 0 for all times τ > t, even if player j’s type
changes to θj . Furthermore, if we have a user-defined
type θ∗j which approximates the true type θj of player j
in a subset S∗ ⊂ S (i.e. pij(Ht, aj , θ∗j ) ≈ pij(Ht, aj , θj)
for st ∈ S∗), but not outside S∗, then (2) might assign
zero probability to θ∗j once player j leaves S
∗. However,
θ∗j may be the best approximation we have for S
∗, so
it would be useful if (2) was able to quickly reassign
positive probability to θ∗j once player j returns to S
∗.
To address these problems, we introduce temporally
reweighted posteriors:
Definition 9. A temporally reweighted posterior (TR-
posterior) is defined as in (2) by redefining
L(Ht|θj) =
t−1∑
τ=0
f(t− τ)pij(Hτ , aτj , θj) (4)
where f(ξ) ≥ 0 and f(ξ) ≥ f(ξ + 1), for all ξ ∈ N+.
The function f is called the time weight and can assume
various forms. An example of a simple but useful time
weight, called the general time weight, is given by f(ξ) =
max[0, a−b(ξ−1)c] where a, b, c ∈ R+0 . This time weight
can be used to produce various behaviours, depending
on the parameters a, b, c. In particular, it can be used
to give greater importance to more recent events, which
means that HBA is able to quickly reassign probabilities.
However, the crucial aspect of (4) is that it defines a sum
rather than a product, which means that the problems
described above do not occur.
3.2 Conceptual Types
If the user-defined type space Θ∗j for player j does not
include the true type space Θj (i.e. Θj 6⊂ Θ∗j ), then j
might assume a type which is unknown to HBA, caus-
ing its expected payoffs to be inaccurate. In such cases,
it would be useful if HBA was able to learn new types
from experience. This opens up the possibility of us-
ing methods for opponent modelling (e.g. case-based
reasoning [Wendler and Bach, 2004] or recursive mod-
elling [Gmytrasiewicz and Durfee, 2000]) which can be
included in Θ∗j . In this work, we use a combination of
case-based reasoning and fictitious play [Brown, 1951],
called conceptual types. Conceptual types are based on
the observation that behaviour may not be specified
on a state-by-state basis but rather on abstractions of
state spaces. (An example are the “information sets”
in extensive form games.) That is, there may be some
world conceptualisation inherent in a behaviour. While
the types in Θ∗j are used to hypothesise behaviours
directly, a conceptual type can be used to hypothe-
sise a world conceptualisation underlying a player’s
behaviour. Combined with the player’s observed ac-
tions, this can be used to generalise actions to unseen
states and increase accuracy in rarely visited states.
Definition 10. A conceptual type (c-type) θcj for player
j is a tuple (dj , r, f), where dj : S × S → R+0 is a
symmetric distance function for pairs of states, r ∈
R+ is a radius, and f is a time weight (as defined in
Section 3.1), with
pij(H
t, aj , θ
c
j) =
{ |Aj |−1 if @τ <t : g(st, sτ )>0 else
η
∑
aτ∈Ht: aτj=aj f(t− τ) g(s
t, sτ )
where g(s1, s2) = max
[
0 , 1− dj(s1, s2) r−1
]
and η is a
normalisation constant s.t.
∑
aj
pij(H
t, aj , θ
c
j) = 1.
The function g is the hypothesised world conceptualisa-
tion of player j, where dj and r specify how similar two
states are from the perspective of player j (examples
given in Section 4). The time weight f can be used to
give greater importance to recent events, which allow
c-types to adapt quickly to changing behaviours. Note
that we can include multiple c-types in Θ∗j , each cor-
responding to a different world conceptualisation, and
the posterior filters out those types which do not fit.
4 Simulated Experiments
4.1 Experimental Setup
We evaluated different configurations of HBA in a mul-
tiagent logistics domain called level-based foraging (see
Figure 1). A level-based foraging problem consists of a
rectangular grid with n players and m foods. Each field
in the grid is either empty or occupied by one player
or one food. All players and foods have a level (∈ N+)
where no food has a level greater than the sum of any
4 players’ levels. A player can choose among 5 actions:
N , E, S, W , and load. The first 4 actions move the
player into the corresponding direction if the field is
empty and inside the grid. A group of 1 to 4 players
can load a food if they are placed on fields next to the
food and if the sum of their levels is at least as high
as the food’s level. A player which successfully loads a
food obtains a payoff equal to the level of the loaded
food. At all other times, it receives a negative payoff
of -0.01. To avoid conflicts and keep this solvable, the
foods are placed such that the Euclidean distance be-
tween each of them is greater than 1, and no food is
placed at any border of the grid. The players’ goal is to
Figure 1: Level-based foraging domain. Players are
marked by circles and foods are marked by squares
(the levels are shown inside). Left: Each player can load
a food. Right: No player can load a food.
collect all foods in minimal time, while also trying to
maximise their own payoffs. Since the players have dif-
ferent abilities (i.e. levels) and are spatially distributed,
this requires strong coordination of their behaviours.
We specify 6 classes of types. The first 4 classes contain
types with fixed behaviours (i.e. they do not change over
time). They each have a parameter σ which specifies
the radius of their sight: H1 always goes to the closest
visible food. H2 goes to the one visible food which is
closest to the centre of all visible players. H3 always
goes to the closest visible food with compatible level
(i.e. it can load it) and H4 goes to the one visible food
which is closest to all visible players such that the sum
of their and H4’s level is sufficient to load the food. H1-4
try to load the food once they are next to it. If they do
not see a food, they go into a random direction. The
last two classes specify types with learning behaviours:
Class 5 contains all instances of JAL and class 6 all
instances of CJAL, as specified in the next paragraph.
We evaluated various configurations of HBA and three
alternative algorithms: JAL [Claus and Boutilier, 1998]
learns the action frequencies of each player in each state
(i.e. opponent modelling) and uses them to compute
expected action payoffs; CJAL [Banerjee and Sen, 2007]
is similar to JAL but learns the frequencies conditioned
on its own actions; WoLF-PHC [Bowling and Veloso,
2002] is a hill-climbing method in the space of mixed
strategies. All three algorithms behave differently in ad
hoc coordination [Albrecht and Ramamoorthy, 2012].
A single framework (Algorithm 2) was used to imple-
ment each ad hoc agent. We assume that the ad hoc
agent is able to observe the states of the game, each
player’s actions, and its own payoffs. For simplicity, we
also assume that the agent knows the levels of all play-
ers and foods. The framework uses a table Q to learn
the expected long-term payoffs of joint actions, similar
to Q-learning [Watkins and Dayan, 1992]. To acceler-
ate learning, it uses an eligibility trace e (see [Sutton
and Barto, 1998]) to connect current payoffs with past
actions. We assume that the agent has access to a simu-
lator Simulate(s, a) which, based on the transition (T )
and payoff (ui) functions of the game, returns a succes-
sor state s′ and payoff u after taking joint action a in
state s. This simulator is used in a sampling-based plan-
ning procedure [Kearns et al., 1999] Expand(d, s, eˆ)
which, starting in state s, generates a future trajectory
of length d and updates Q using the eligibility trace eˆ.
The function ExpPay(Q, s, ai) computes the expected
payoff for taking action ai in state s based on Q, and the
function OppActions(s) samples actions for all other
players j 6= i in state s. HBA implements Expand us-
ing (1) and its posterior, and OppActions using its
posterior and user-defined types. C/JAL implement
these functions using their learned action frequencies.
Algorithm 2 Reinforcement learning framework
Set Q(s, a)← 0 and e(s, a)← 0 for all (s, a) ∈ S ×A
Repeat until st ∈ S¯:
Observe: current state st
With probability 1−1: ati = ChooseAction(st),
else sample ati ∼ Ai
Observe: joint action at, own payoff uti, next state s
t+1
UpdateQ(st, at, uti, s
t+1, e)
Repeat x times: Expand(d, st+1,Copy(e))
Expand(d, s, eˆ):
Repeat d times or until s ∈ S¯:
With probability 1−2: ai = ChooseAction(s),
else sample ai ∼ Ai
a−i ← OppActions(s)
(ui, s
′)← Simulate(s, (ai, a−i))
UpdateQ(s, (ai, a−i), ui, s′, eˆ)
s← s′
UpdateQ(s, a, u, s′, eˆ):
δ = β(u+ γmaxaˆiExpPay(Q, s
′, aˆi)−Q(s, a))
eˆ(s, a)← 1
For all (sˆ, aˆ) ∈ S ×A s.t. eˆ(sˆ, aˆ) ≥ emin do:
Q(sˆ, aˆ)← Q(sˆ, aˆ) + δ eˆ(sˆ, aˆ)
eˆ(sˆ, aˆ)← λ eˆ(sˆ, aˆ)
ChooseAction(s):
Return ai∼ arg maxaˆiExpPay(Q, s, aˆi)
For WoLF-PHC, the framework defines Q and e on
S × Ai (rather than S × A) and ExpPay(Q, s, ai) is
simply defined as Q(s, ai). Since WoLF-PHC does not
model its opponents, we implement OppActions the
same way as in JAL. The function ChooseAction(s)
is redefined to ai ∼ pi(s), where pi is the mixed strategy
maintained in WoLF-PHC (cf. Tables 5 and 6 in [Bowl-
ing and Veloso, 2002]).
All algorithms used identical parameters: β = .2, γ = .9,
λ = .9, emin = .01, 1 = 0, 2 = .2, x = 3, d = 20. For
WoLF-PHC, we used learning rates δw(t) = (1000 +
t
10 )
−1 and δl(t) = 2 δw(t). For HBA, we used uniform
prior beliefs (P (θ∗j ) = |Θ∗j |−1) and a = 10, b = .01,
c = 3 for the general time weight. To obtain estimates
of flexibility and efficiency, we used Algorithm 1 with
i = 1, r1 = r2 = 1,K = 1000, where we assumed a path
to be non-terminating if it reached t = 1000. The initial
states were generated with random positions and levels
for all players and foods, with the maximum level being
equal to the number of players. All agents were tested
on the same sequence of games and random numbers.
4.2 Results
We tested the effectiveness of TR-posteriors by simu-
lating the two situations described in Section 3.1. All
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Figure 2: Results of simulated experiments, averaged over 1000 runs. Markers have the same colour if the difference
is statistically insignificant (based on paired t-test with 5% significance level). “Cor” is HBA with correct types,
“Gtw” is HBA using TR-posterior with general time weight, “Unl” is HBA with unlimited normal posterior, and
“Lim” is HBA with normal posterior limited to 9 most recent events.
tests were run on a 8×8 grid with 2 players and 5 foods.
In Figure 2a, we used Θ2 = Θ
∗
2 = {H1–H4 |σ =∞}
and a dynamic pure type distribution which changed
the type of player 2 after every 10 to 20 time steps.
In Figure 2b, we used Θ2 = {H1–H4 |σ = 3, 5, 7},
Θ∗2 = {H1–H4 |σ =∞} (i.e the types in Θ∗2 were accu-
rate only for subsets S∗ ⊂ S) and a static pure type
distribution. In both cases, the efficiency of HBA was
significantly higher when using a TR-posterior with gen-
eral time weight (Gtw) compared to both the normal
posterior defined in (2) (Unl) and a normal posterior
which was limited to the 9 most recent events (Lim),
which is the same time frame used in Gtw. In Fig-
ure 2a, Gtw even achieved the same efficiency as a
version of HBA which always knew the correct type
of the other player (Cor). All HBA agents achieved a
perfect flexibility of 1.
We tested HBA with 4 conceptual types θcj = (d
c
j , r, f)
where f(ξ) = [ξ < 10]1 and r = 1. In the following,
we write s.pj (s.fk) to refer to the position of player j
(food fk) in state s, and fk ∈ s to say that food fk is
available in state s. The distance functions dcj are
d1j (s1,s2)=[s1 6= s2]1∞
d2j (s1,s2)=[s1.pj = s2.pj ∧ ∀k : fk ∈ s1 ⇔ fk ∈ s2]1∞
d3j (s1,s2)=φ(s1.pj ,s2.pj)+
∑
k:fk∈s1∨fk∈s2ψ(s1.fk, µ)
−32
d4j (s1,s2)=d
3
j (s1, s2)+
∑
v φ(s1.pv, s2.pv)ω
−1.5
v
where φ(x1, x2)=log(1+ψ(x1,x2))
1
2 , µ=s1.pj+
1
2 (s2.pj−
s1.pj), ωv=min[ψ(s1.pv, µ), ψ(s2.pv, µ)], and ψ(x1, x2)
denotes the Euclidean distance between x1 and x2. All
tests were run on a 8×8 grid with 2 players and 5 foods,
using Θ2 = {H1–H4,JAL,CJAL |σ =∞} (C/JAL used
same parameters as HBA), Θ∗2 = {θc2} (each c = 1, ..., 4
tested separately), and a static pure type distribution.
The results in Figure 2c show that HBA achieved good
efficiency (compared to Cor) using θ2j , while the other
c-types were less efficient. All HBA agents achieved
statistically equivalent flexibilities of 0.86± 0.01.
Finally, we tested HBA, JAL, CJAL, and WoLF-PHC
on a 10 × 10 grid with 3 players and 8 foods, using
Θ2,3 = {H1–H4,JAL,CJAL |σ = 5, 7, 9} and Θ∗2,3 =
{H1–H4 |σ =∞}. To add more realism, players 2 and
3 were “defective” with probability 0.2, where a defec-
tive player changed its type randomly every 10 to 30
time steps. While the potential of HBA is demonstrated
by Cor, it would also be useful to know the optimal solu-
tion to the problem. However, with a complex problem
such as this one, we were unable to compute optimal
solutions. Instead, we had 6 humans play the game in
a graphical user interface (each one played the full 1000
runs, distributed over 7 days at their own convenience),
where no human was familiar with the technical details
of this work. We do not necessarily claim that humans
produce optimal solutions, but we expect them to per-
form consistently well in this setting. To cope with the
increased problem size, we set the planning power of
the algorithms to x = 10 and d = 30 (cf. Algorithm 2).
The results (Figure 2d) show that HBA clearly outper-
formed all alternative algorithms, with Unl and Gtw
being over 100% and 200% more efficient, respectively.
This is despite the fact that the user-defined types Θ∗2,3
did not include any true types of the players. We also
tested HBA with the c-types θ1j and θ
3
j (added sepa-
rately to Θ∗2,3) but found that the efficiency of HBA did
not improve significantly. This is since C/JAL learned
similar behaviours to H1 and H3, which were already
covered in Θ∗2,3. We found that HBA’s posteriors often
assigned high probabilities to H1/3 when the true type
of the player was in fact C/JAL. Since H1/3 ignore
other players, this means that C/JAL did not effec-
tively coordinate their behaviours with other players.
We found similar results for WoLF-PHC. As was ex-
pected, the humans achieved high efficiency (Figure 2d
shows the best human) and outperformed even Cor.
One reason for this is the fact that the humans had
much greater planning power than HBA. Lastly, HBA
achieved higher flexibilities (.83± .01) than JAL (.734),
CJAL (.749), and WoLF-PHC (.744), while the humans
all achieved perfect flexibility (1.0).
5 Human-Machine Experiment
5.1 Experimental Setup
We conducted a large-scale human-machine experiment
at the Royal Society Summer Science Exhibition 2012.
Therein, the human participants played repeated Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (PD) and Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS)
against HBA and alternative algorithms, where each
game was played for 20 rounds. We collected data from
427 participants, of which 186 played PD and 241 played
RPS. The lowest and highest recorded ages were 9 and
72, respectively, with an average age of about 17.
A large public exhibition such as this one is an excellent
testbed environment for ad hoc agents, since the visitors
vary widely in factors such as age, intelligence, and be-
haviour. However, in order to make statistically relevant
comparisons, we required data from many participants.
Therefore, the games needed to be simple enough so
participants would understand them quickly, yet they
also needed to be interesting in terms of coordination
strategies. PD and RPS are two widely studied prob-
lems in game theory which we believe cover these prop-
erties. In PD, the symmetric payoffs are u1(C,C)=3,
u1(D,D)=1, u1(C,D)=0, u1(D,C)=5. The problem
here is that the only NE, and hence stable outcome,
is at (D,D), while (C,C) is the only outcome that has
both the highest welfare (sum of payoffs) and fairness
(product of payoffs) but is unstable since the players
could deviate to obtain higher immediate payoffs. In
RPS, the payoffs are +1/0/-1 for won/even/lost games.
The only NE is for all players to play randomly. How-
ever, even if humans attempt to play randomly, they
often fall back to patterns [Wagenaar, 1972] against
which the other player can coordinate its actions.
Our hypothesis for the experiment was that the human
would switch between several simple behaviours, as op-
posed to having one complex behaviour. Therefore, we
modelled the problem as a SBG with a dynamic mixed
type distribution (unknown to us) which governed the
type of the human, and we provided HBA with a small
set of types (given in Tables 1 and 2) which we be-
lieved the human could have. HBA did not use any
conceptual types.
The alternative algorithms were CJAL for PD, which
was shown to outperform both JAL and WoLF-PHC
in PD [Banerjee and Sen, 2007], and JAL for RPS,
which is guaranteed to converge to NE in self-play
in zero-sum games [Brown, 1951]. We implemented
all algorithms using a single framework (Algorithm 3),
where we set l∗ = 10 for PD, l∗ = 1 for RPS, and t∗ = 20.
The function OppStrat(sτ , aτ ) returns the probability
that players j 6= i choose actions aτj in state sτ . HBA
implements this by averaging over all user-defined types
in Θ∗j using its current posterior, and C/JAL do this
Algorithm 3 Exact planning framework
Repeat:
Observe current state st
For all ai ∈ Ai do:
Ω(ai) =
{
〈st, at, ..., st+l, at+l〉 | ati = ai
}
where l = min[l∗, t∗ − t]− 1
E(ai) =
∑
ω∈Ω(ai)
[
t+l∏
τ=t
OppStrat(sτ , aτ )
t+l∑
τ=t
ui(s
τ , aτ )
]
Sample action ati ∼ arg maxai E(ai)
using their learned actions frequencies. While PD and
RPS have no states, we found that the performance
of C/JAL could be further improved by introducing
“artificial” states, which we simply defined as st = at−1
(in the first round, C/JAL assumed the opponent to
play randomly). HBA used uniform prior beliefs and
the general time weight with a = 10, b = 0.05, c = 3.
The procedure of the experiment was as follows: First,
we randomly sampled a participant from the set of
visitors which were currently at our exhibit. The partic-
ipant was then brought to a dedicated table with a chair
and a laptop on it. The laptop ran a programme, with
an intuitive graphical user interface, which prompted
the participant to choose between PD and RPS. The
rules of the games were explained both textually in the
programme and in person by one of our staff members
to make sure the participant understood the rules. The
game was then played in two matches, each lasting 20
rounds. One of the matches was against HBA and the
other match against C/JAL, but this was hidden from
the participant and the order was chosen randomly.
The programme displayed the current match, round,
and scores of all players, and also allowed to display
the rules at any time. At the end of each round, the
participant was shown the actions and scores of both
players, and at the end of each match, the participant
was given a summary of the scores.
5.2 Results
In the following, all significance statements are based
on paired t-tests with 5% significance level. Figures 3a
and 3b show the results for PD and RPS, respectively.
In both games, the average total payoffs of HBA and
C/JAL were statistically equivalent. Since the time was
fixed to 20 rounds, it means that they achieved equal
efficiency. This is, in fact, a positive result considering
that C/JAL are strong candidates in PD/RPS. In addi-
tion, as we discuss in the following, HBA behaved very
differently from C/JAL, with beneficial side effects.
In PD, the most desirable long-term outcome is (C,C)
HBA CJAL
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Figure 3: Results of the human-machine experiment. Circles and whiskers correspond to mean, minimum, and
maximum values, respectively. The welfare plot in (a) shows the median value and 25%/75% percentiles.
since it is both welfare and fairness optimal, and since
it is a non-myopic equilibrium [Brams, 1993], mean-
ing that no player has a long-term incentive to deviate.
With this in mind, we point out that in over 28% of the
games, HBA and the human played (C,C) in at least
50% of the final 10 rounds of the game, while CJAL did
not achieve this in any game. Thus, HBA achieved a sig-
nificantly higher total welfare than CJAL (Figure 3a).
This is despite the fact that neither of them was op-
timised for social welfare. The reason for this is that
HBA was planning more accurately than CJAL. When
computing the expected payoffs E(ai), CJAL uses its
learned action frequencies to obtain probabilities for
each trajectory in Ω(ai). However, these probabilities
can only be accurate for states that have been visited
frequently enough. Moreover, if a player changes its be-
haviour, CJAL requires new evidence from all states to
accurately reflect the change. On the other hand, HBA
uses its posterior and types to compute probabilities of
trajectories. Therefore, once HBA has an accurate pos-
terior, it can use the types to accurately plan in the
entire state space of the game, including unseen states.
This also allows HBA to plan the effects of its actions
on the other player, which means that HBA may take
actions to manipulate the player’s decisions. Finally, if
a player changes its behaviour, HBA only needs to up-
date its posterior, which requires much less information
than the update in CJAL.
In RPS, the crucial questions is whether a player is
winning or not. Interestingly, the winning rate of HBA
(53.71%) was significantly higher than the winning rate
of JAL (43.98%), as shown in Figure 3b. While in PD
the good performance of HBA was due to its planning
capabilities, in RPS this was not as relevant since the
planning horizon was limited to trajectories of length 1.
Rather, HBA’s good performance was due to the fact
that it recognised changed behaviours faster than JAL.
Indeed, in a game such as RPS, it can be expected that
the human players change frequently between different
strategies. This is confirmed by the statistics shown
in Figure 3c, which show the average number of types
used by the human players and the average duration.
The statistics are based on HBA’s posteriors, where the
number of types for player i in a play corresponds to the
number q in 〈t0, t1, ..., tq〉, with t0 = 0 and tq = 20, for
which arg maxθi Pr(θi|Hτ ) ⊆ arg maxθi Pr(θi|Hτ+1)
for all ty−1 ≤ τ < ty and y ∈ {1, ..., q}, and where
the average duration is 1q
∑
y ty − ty−1. According to
these statistics, the human players had 4.45 types with
a duration of 4.96 rounds in PD, and 8.25 types with a
duration of 2.46 rounds in RPS. Clearly, with a dura-
tion of only 2.46 rounds, planning was not as important
as recognising changed types. By using TR-posteriors,
HBA was able to do this effectively.
6 Summary & Open Questions
This work is concerned with the ad hoc coordination
problem, in which the goal is to design an autonomous
agent (the ad hoc agent) which can achieve optimal
flexibility and efficiency in a multiagent system in which
the behaviour of the other agents is not a priori known.
We make three important contributions to the ad hoc
coordination problem:
1. We propose a game-theoretic model, SBG, which
captures the notion of private information in the
form of types. Based in this model, we give formally
concise definitions of flexibility, efficiency, and the
ad hoc coordination problem. We also provide a
procedure which can be used to estimate the ad
hoc agent’s flexibility and efficiency.
2. From this model, we derive a principled solution,
HBA, which utilises a set of user-defined types
in a planning procedure to find optimal actions
in the sense of Bayesian Nash equilibrium and
Bellman optimal control. We also propose two
possible extensions which enable HBA to recognise
changed types and learn new types.
3. We show how HBA can be implemented as a rein-
forcement learning and exact planning procedure,
and we provide extensive empirical evaluations
in a complex multiagent logistics domain and a
large-scale human-machine experiment. Our re-
sults show that HBA is both more flexible and
efficient than alternative methods.
The work presented in this paper provides a rich ground
for future research, including the following open ques-
tions:
• A crucial design parameter of HBA are the user-
defined type spaces Θ∗j provided to it. In this re-
gard, an important direction for future research
would be to analyse how closely Θ∗j must approx-
imate Θj for HBA to be able to achieve optimal
flexibility and efficiency.
• Another design parameter of HBA is the poste-
rior Pr(·|Ht), and in this work we discussed two
different formulations (the product posterior and
TR-posteriors). It would be interesting to explore
alternative posterior formulations and to analyse
the conditions under which they are guaranteed
to converge to the type distribution of the game.
• The prior belief P can be considered a meta-
parameter of HBA (it is a parameter of the poste-
rior, which in turn is a parameter of HBA), and in
our experiments we assumed that the prior beliefs
were uniform. An interesting question in this re-
gard is whether HBA could automatically derive
prior beliefs from the user-defined type spaces so
as to further maximise its efficiency.
• HBA currently assumes that an expert can pro-
vide manually specified types for the problem at
hand. However, this can be a cumbersome task
in complex domains. Future work could investi-
gate how HBA might generate useful types from
the problem description so that the burden of hav-
ing to manually specify types can be alleviated, or
perhaps eliminated altogether.
• Finally, as we employ HBA in increasingly complex
problem domains, it becomes apparent that the
type specifications, likewise, become increasingly
complex. One way to reduce this type complexity
might be to use a hierarchical type specification, in
which types are structured into smaller sub-types.
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PD type Definition
AlwaysC ati = C
TitForTat a0i = C, a
t
i = a
t−1
j
TitFor2Tats a0,1i = C, a
t
i = C if a
t−1,t−2
j = C else D
Optimistic pii(C,H
t) = 1 if t < 2 ∨ at−1j = C ∨ µ = 0 else 0.2 + 0.8σ
Pessimistic pii(D,H
t) = 1 if t < 2 ∨ at−1j = D else 0.2 + [µ > 0]10.8σ
µ =
∑t−2
τ=0[a
τ
i = C]1, σ =
1
µ
∑t−2
τ=0[a
τ
i = a
τ+1
j = C]1
Table 1: PD types. [b]1 = 1 iff. b is true, else 0.
RPS type Definition
Copycat a0i ∼ U(Ai), ati = at−1j
RetryIfWon ati ∼ U(Ai) if t = 0 ∨ ui(at−1) < 0 else ati = at−1i
i-focused(h) pii(ai, H
t) = g(ai, x)/
∑
aˆi∈Ai g(aˆi, x), x = min[t, h]
h ∈ {1, 2} g(ai, x) = max
[
0, x−∑xτ=1[at−τi = ai]1(x+ 1− τ)]
j-focused(h) ati ∼ arg maxai
∑
aj∈Aj pij(aj , H
t)ui(ai, aj)
h ∈ {1, 2} where pij(aj , Ht) is obtained using i-focused(h) for j
Table 2: RPS types. U is the uniform distribution.
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